The use of drug price controls is a contentious issue globally. Low-and middle-income countries use direct price controls to improve access to essential drugs. But such price controls have little meaning if they are not designed and implemented well, and the extent to which firms coordinate in these countries to weaken price controls has been largely overlooked. In mid-2013, India adopted partial price-cap regulation for some, but not all, formulations of several essential medicines. Using data on sales and prices of the out-of-patent oral antidiabetic drug Metformin-considered essential by WHO since 1998-and employing the differences-in-differences methodology, we examine the impact of the regulation on curbing prices. We find that firms coordinated to increase the price of the regulated formulation in the period before regulation, which led to a higher ceiling price. We also find, using triple-differences analyses, that the coordination is stronger among larger firms and for time-release formulations. We present anecdotal evidence to suggest that pharmaceutical trade associations facilitated coordination among firms, and we conclude that partial price control of Metformin in India is, at best, a modest improvement over no regulation.
Introduction
Improving access to basic drugs considered essential for treating many diseases remains an important policy goal for low-and middle-income countries. Many such countries maintain a national list of essential medicines (NLEM) based on the World Health Organization's (WHO) model list, updated every two years (IMS Institute 2015) . Evidence on the impact of policies designed to improve access to essential drugs in developing countries such as India is limited (Meng et al. 2005; Yang et al. 2010 Yang et al. , 2013 . Instead, research has focused more on estimating the impact of price controls on access to new drugs and incentives for innovation (Kyle 2007; Berndt and Cockburn 2014; Cockburn et al. 2016) .
In this article, we look at the effectiveness of price-control policies in improving access to essential drugs in India, one of the countries with millions of low-income consumers, high private expenditures on health care, and a nascent health insurance market and reimbursement mechanism. In its efforts to balance promotion of the domestic industry and access to essential drugs, India delayed the revision of its price-control regime by a decade. In May 2013, following considerable judicial and social activism, India regulated the prices of 652 formulations of 348 drugs Selvaraj and Farooqui 2012) . Among these drugs is an out-ofpatent, first-generation oral antidiabetic drug called Metformin, which WHO had added to its model list of essential drugs in 1998 (WHO Model List 1977 -2011 . Metformin is the preferred choice for initial treatment of diabetes mellitus (Berkowitz et al. 2014) . In India, Metformin is crucial to fighting diabetes, which, according to statistics collected in 2011, affects 62.4 million people (Shetty 2012; Yesudian et al. 2014) . The WHO defines only the 500 mg of Metformin as an essential medicine, leaving out other dosage formulations as non-essential, using a selection procedure that is not unique to Metformin (see, for a review, Laing et al. 2003) . Naturally, the WHO procedure to approve a medicine to be included in its model list has been criticised recently (Barbui and Purgato 2014; Millard et al. 2014) . Nonetheless, following the WHO guidelines, India also limits the definition of the essential drug to 500 mg tablets of Metformin, leaving other formulations unregulated.
The case of Metformin allows us to compare the evolution of price in 500 mg and non-500 mg formulations of the 'same' medicine before and after regulation and to document differential firm responses using the differences-in-differences (DD) methodology (Angrist and Pischke 2008) . The regulated and unregulated formulations are comparable, as both are oral tablets taken at home daily. Significant clinical responses are not seen at daily doses below 1500 mg, indicating that patients can use either formulation to meet daily dosage requirements (NIH 2006) . The results of our quasiexperimental study show that firms coordinated to manipulate the 500 mg Metformin ceiling price in the period before regulation, in part by raising the prices of the time-release versions of the 500 mg formulation, which have a higher average price compared with the plain version. The coordination was stronger among 16 of the 112 firms with at least a 1% market share in the 500 mg formulation, and the average of their prices determined the ceiling price.
Collective interest to avoid price regulation does not, by itself, translate into effective coordination among the many firms producing Metformin in India, as each firm has an incentive to cheat. Yet we find anecdotal evidence to suggest that pharmaceutical industry trade associations in India facilitated effective coordination. For example, the Indian Drug Manufacturers Association (IDMA) has a 'Regulatory Affairs' subcommittee to determine the collective response of its membership to regulatory issues raised by drug price control orders (DPCOs)-the subcommittee is chaired by a top executive of Micro Labs Ltd, a major producer of Metformin, with a 4.5% market share in 500 mg (IDMA 2014) . The Organization of Pharmaceutical Producers of India, the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance and the IDMA have played a central role in price coordination by lobbying jointly to influence the formula to determine the ceiling price (IDMA Annual Report 2011). They challenged the order in the Bombay and Delhi high courts (Economic Times 2014; The Hindu 2014), attempted to delay the implementation of DPCO 2013 by seeking concession for the sale of old stocks (IDMA 2013) and, finally, advised its members on how to mitigate the impact of price controls. These industry trade associations have agreements with the All India Organization of Chemists and Druggists (AIOCD), an organization that controls the entire distribution channel and the flow of medicines from firms to consumers. There is evidence to suggest that the AIOCD punishes cheating firms by organizing a sales boycott. The Competition Commission of India recently determined in two separate cases that the practices of these trade associations amounted to cartelizing the pharmaceutical industry (CCI 2011).
Naturally, our results must be interpreted with caution, as they are based on the study of a single medicine in a single country. Our purpose in this paper is to show the existence of such price coordination among firms, although an examination of the extent of this coordination across all price-controlled medicines in India and in other low-and middle-income countries is beyond the scope of this study.
The economics of drug price controls
Industries such as public utilities, telecommunications, and health care use price-cap regulation, which fixes ceiling prices (Abbott 1995) . This type of regulation retains a firm's freedom to choose prices below the ceiling and its ability to earn higher profit by lowering costs. Therefore, price-cap regulation is generally considered superior to cost-based mechanisms that limit profit margins. Yet firms with knowledge of the timing and mechanism of ceiling-price determination can coordinate to manipulate pre-regulation prices and weaken the effectiveness of the price cap (Glazer and McMillan 1992; Foreman 1995; Cowan 1997) . For example, if the ceiling price is determined according to the weighted average of prices in the period before regulation, firms have an incentive to coordinate and increase prices collectively (Law 1997) . Firms may also coordinate to reduce prices in order to preempt regulation altogether (Ellison and Wolfram 2006) . The incentives and ability to manipulate prices are higher in markets with rapidly increasing demand and shorter product cycles (Neu 1993; Abbott and Crew 1994) . Abbott (1995) argues that these problems are exacerbated in the pharmaceutical industry, where the challenges associated with imposing comprehensive price-cap regulation provide ample scope to manipulate the ceiling price:
The critical question is how to define the product for purposes of the price cap. Is a bottle of 50 400 mg tablets the same product as a bottle of 25 800 mg tablets? What if additional active ingredients are added to one but not the other? Or, what if one product is in solid form and the other in liquid? Clearly, there are many ways in which the same basic active ingredient could be incorporated into a "new product," and the pharmaceutical industry is noted for its ingenuity in developing alternative presentations. Introducing one and phasing out the other might enable the pharmaceutical firm to avoid the price cap and could be very difficult to detect -was the product changed in order to get around the price cap or is the "new" product really better for consumers? (p. 555) The challenges associated with price-cap regulation on essential medicines are likely to be greater in low-and middle-income countries with inherent weaknesses in national health systems, health policy design, implementation, and monitoring. A recent analysis by IMS Health shows that many countries modify the WHO model list of essential drugs for country-specific priorities (IMS Institute 2015) . However, the study finds that countries such as India omit important oral antidiabetic medicines such as Glimepiride, Glicazide and many paediatric formulations, reflecting a mismatch between the country's public health needs and its drug policy (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2011). We examine the policy process leading up to and following the implementation of recent price controls in India to determine their effectiveness.
The drug price control regime in India India has regulated drug prices since the 1970s using a series of DPCOs, although we are not aware of a systematic analysis of the impact (for an overview, see Selvaraj 2007) . The number of pricecontrolled drugs declined from 347 in 1979 to 74 in 1995. The mechanism for price control also changed from controlling profit margins in 1970 to ceilings on post-manufacturing margins in 1995. In 2002, the industry lobby in India successfully thwarted the government's attempt to revise the price control regime, describing it as an alarming development that would lead to higher prices and an underground market for spurious and counterfeit drugs (Kumar 2004) .The Indian government has resisted expanding the span of price controls in 2002 but subsequent public interest litigation filed by several members of the civil society prompted it to constitute the Pronab Sen Task Force, 'to explore options other than price control' for lowering prices of essential medicines, which noted in its report on 20 September 2005 (Sen 2005 ):
The Task Force recommends that price regulation should be on the basis of 'Essentiality' of the drug and it should be applied only to formulations and not to upstream products, such as bulk drugs. No effort should be made to impose a uniform price, and only a ceiling price should be indicated. The ceiling price of essential drugs should normally not be based on cost of production but on readily monitorable market based benchmarks.
Despite the task force recommendations, India's draft National Pharmaceutical Policy of 2006 released only Part A of the document to the public and kept the part on drug price controls confidential (NPP 2006) . Although the Minister of Chemicals and Fertilizersresponsible for administering the pharmaceutical industry-publicly favoured of price controls (eg. Mint 2008), other ministries including Health, Commerce and Industry, Consumer Affairs, and Finance opposed price controls citing potential drug shortages, harmful effects in export markets, and the potential rise of counterfeit drugs respectively (Srinivasan 2006) .
In 2013, due to a sustained judicial intervention, India began to regulate the prices of all medicines on its national list of 348 essential medicines, including Metformin, and shifted from cost-based measures to price-cap regulation. The latest DPCO introduced in 2013 has few supporters, regardless of their views on price controls. Multinational firms are apprehensive that, under price controls, their margins will be too low to launch new medicines and to continue sales in the existing medicine markets (Cockburn et al. 2016) . The domestic pharmaceutical industry and the retail trade association characterize the DPCO as unnecessary and argue that the industry-composed of several large and small generic firms and multinationals-remains highly competitive (PharmaBiz 2013) . Both the activist judiciary that ordered legislative action and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that lobbied for price controls characterize the new order as inadequate and ineffective, pointing out that it leaves out several essential medicines (Selvaraj and Farooqui 2012; Times of India 2015) .
The debate on the contents of the most recent order has continued long after its 2013 revision, prompting a patchwork of amendments. In July 2014, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA)-designated as the supervising authority-extended price controls to include an additional 108 antidiabetic and cardiovascular medicines (NPPA 2014) . The NPPA argued that, although these medicines differ from related price-controlled medicines in terms of binders, fillers, dyes, preservatives, coating agents and dissolution agents, they do not differ in their therapeutic value. The NPPA invoked paragraph 19 of DPCO 2013 to monitor and, if necessary, regulate prices of drugs currently not regulated but considered essential. By September 2014, however, the order was withdrawn due to non-compliance from pharmaceutical firms and directives from the government (First Post 2014; PharmaBiz 2014a).
The 2013 DPCO has introduced two policy changes. First, it selectively applies price controls to some formulations of the chosen medicines-based largely on their dosage strengths-and excludes other formulations of the same medicine and its fixed-dose combinations. Second, it uses a market-based approach to determine the ceiling price. The National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy (2012) published on 7 December 2012 mandated that the simple average of the top brands in the market with at least a 1% market share would be used to determine the ceiling price. One year before the final policy was published, the NPPA proposed in its draft version of the policy that it would use the weighted average of the top three brands to determine the ceiling price-a method that many stakeholders severely criticized. In particular, the WHO noted that the method 'effectively means topping off the prices of the top brands' (Economic Times 2011). Surprisingly, the 2013 DPCO failed to distinguish the generally costlier time-release formulations of the regulated medicines from the non-time-release ones. As a result, if the top brands of 500 mg Metformin include time-release formulations, they push up the ceiling price.
Historical accounts suggest that the implementation of price regulation has been ineffective in India. The implementation of price controls was delayed by 4 years after the special committee set up for this purpose by the government of India-the Hathi committee-submitted its recommendations in 1975 (Bal 1986a) . In 1986, medicines to be brought under price regulation were left ambiguous to allow for industry associations to influence policy on behalf of pharmaceutical firms (Bal 1986b) . The influence of these lobbies is evident from Minister for Chemicals and Fertilisers Veerendra Patil's admission in the Indian Parliament in the late 1980s that the long-expected drug policy was being delayed due to resistance from industry associations (EPW 1985) . In August 1990, the industry and the trade associations threatened to organize a nationwide strike unless the implementation of new price control initiatives was postponed (EPW 1990) . After the implementation of the 1995 DPCO, prices reportedly increased, benefiting the pharmaceutical firms (Rane 1995) . In addition, when companies do violate price ceilings, the existing regulatory framework imposes no penalty (Times of India 2016).
Currently, in case a company is caught overcharging, it is not required to pay any penalty but only pay the overcharged amount along with interest for the period during which the overcharging took place. . ..The regulator is of the view that there is need for a tougher law to discourage drug makers from cheating consumers, who essentially depend on doctors' prescription and are not equipped to make an informed decision while purchasing medicines.
In view of these salient features of the new regulation and its implementation, we examine its impact on the affordability of Metformin in India.
Study data and methods
We use the case of Metformin, for which we have data, to illustrate the extent to which price controls were effective, although anecdotal evidence suggests that the arguments may apply more broadly. We choose to study Metformin because the incentive for firms to coordinate on prices and manipulate the prospective ceiling price is large in the market for a medicine such as Metformin. Metformin's patents have long since expired, and it has emerged as the preferred medicine for type-2 diabetes worldwide (Berkowitz et al. 2014) . Since diabetes is a chronic rather than an acute disease, medicines such as Metformin are taken daily, and the market for it is growing rapidly in India. As a result, regulators, NGOs, the judiciary and the industry have attempted to influence the extent of regulation in Metformin other such markets, making Metformin the ideal context for this study (The Hindu Frontline 2014) .
We use data obtained from India's powerful retail trade association, the AIOCD, for the period March 2007 through March 2015.
1 The data, regarded as highly accurate, represent the census of pharmaceutical firms in India and span the entire country, divided into 23 regional markets, thus limiting selection bias and measurement error. The data contain monthly prices of Metformin brands sold by 91 firms spanning 116 brands of 500 mg and non-500 mg formulations in each of the regional markets in India and their monthly sales revenue for 97 months. The data also contain a detailed description of the particular brands of Metformin sold by each firm, including dosage strength (500, 850 or 1000 mg), delivery type (plain tablet or slow-release tablet), and package size (10, 15, or 20 tablets). 2 In order to facilitate easy comparison of prices across formulations, we normalize the price per 500 mg for medicines of all three strengths and pack sizes using the formula:
Price Per 500 mg ¼ 500 Dosage Strength
Ã

Price of Pack Number of Tablets in Pack :
To analyze the impact of price control regulation on Metformin, we employ the DD regression method (Angrist and Pischke 2008) , which is ideal for estimating the difference in the normalized price between regulated and unregulated formulations before and after regulation. The method is frequently used for health policy evaluation (Carpenter and Stehr 2008; Baird et al. 2011; McKinnon et al. 2015) , as quasi-experimental designs, including DD, produce results similar to those obtained using experimental designs much better than traditional regression methods do (Glazerman et al. 2003; Cook and Shadish 2008) . Using an ordinary least squares regression, we estimate the impact of regulation on price for firm i in dosage market j in region k in month t, using the equation:
where Regulated is the key explanatory variable set to one if the formulation contains 500 mg. We control for other covariates (X), such as the pack size, slow-release feature in tablets, and the HerfindahlHirschman index of market concentration. We also include firm, region, and time fixed effects, which control for secular trends in the outcome that are common across firms, regions, and time. Because we employ several fixed effects, our results cannot be explained away by firm-specific, time-invariant factors such as firm quality, differences in demand characteristics for Metformin across regions in India, and changes over time in the prescription and usage patterns for Metformin in India that affect both 500 and non-500 mg doses alike.
The interaction between the Regulated dummy and the Period dummy captures the difference-in-difference effect. We are particularly interested in the coefficient estimates of c and d; as they represent the effects specific to time periods immediately preceding the regulation, after differencing out the effects specific to other periods before and after regulation.
The period of policy change in our context is not binary but has evolved over a period of time. WHO has considered Metformin essential since 1998. However, at the start of our dataset, India did not regulate Metformin but began the consultation process to revise its list of essential medicines in September 2009, adding it to the essential list in June 2011 and regulating it as of July 2013. Therefore, we define three time Period dummies before regulation and one after: (1) We adopted a conservative approach by identifying a workshop titled 'Expert Group Meeting on Revision and Updating of the NLEMs' held on 16 September 2009 as the beginning of the consultation process, because it is cited in the preamble to the India's NLEM 2011 report as the beginning of the pre-policy discussion period. Yet a more accurate measure of the timing of pre-policy discussion period is likely to be a few months before September 2009 when the government directed its regulator, the Central Drug Standards Control Organization (CDSCO), to organize the workshop or when the government informed the Supreme Court as part of the public interest litigation that it would begin revising the NLEM towards implementing new drug price controls. However, our interviews with the NGOs that led the public interest litigation have not yielded documentary support for choosing an earlier date. Nonetheless, we believe that defining Period 1 more accurately would only improve and strengthen our results.
The DD analysis hinges on the assumption that, in the absence of regulation, the per-gram price in the 500 mg market would have grown at a rate similar to that of the non-500 mg price-an assumption most likely to be justified when comparing dosages within a medicine rather than comparing two substitute medications. Nonetheless, the assumption is violated if the prescription guidelines for the 500 mg formulation change differentially relative to the non-500 mg formulations or if the 500 mg formulation is consumed by patients directly, and the non-500 mg formulations are administered in hospitals. We find no such changes to the prescription guidelines during the study period; we also find that most patients rely on both 500 and 1000 mg dosages to meet their daily dosage requirement (NIH 2006) . Since our data for both 500 mg and non-500 mg formulations are based on direct purchases of medicines by consumers (not hospitals), who consume them orally in the form of tablets, and since diabetes is a chronic condition requiring daily at-home medication for several years, we do not expect Metformin usage characteristics in hospitals to be driving our results. Another concern is whether the relative importance of the treatment group changed drastically during the study period and, thus, biases in our results.
However, as shown in Table 1 , the market shares by dosage did not change significantly enough before or after regulation to explain our results, and the 500 mg and 1000 mg formulations together explain nearly 90% of the sales in the market.
Nonetheless, if our proposed explanation for the differential price increase in the 500 mg market is correct, we should find stronger coordination among larger firms, which have a greater ability to influence ceiling prices. To test this proposition, we identify in our dataset top brands of Metformin within the 500 mg market that had at least a 1% market share during the period before regulation.
3
Using the dummy for top brands, we estimate the following tripledifferences equation:
Based on the uniform treatment that the regulation prescribes for time-release and plain formulations of the 500 mg Metformin, we consider an additional mechanism. The time-release tablets are generally overpriced relative to the plain tablets, a factor that firms can exploit to increase the price of time-release formulations more than that of plain formulations in their efforts to manipulate the ceiling price. We test this proposition using a specification similar to Equation (2).
Study results
In Figure 1 , we plot the number of firms selling Metformin over time. On average, 61 firms sell 69 unique brands of Metformin in a given month, indicating sharp competition and potentially undermining the need for price regulation. Overall, in our dataset 116 brands of Metformin have been sold. It is generally difficult to coordinate on prices in such a market, as >40 firms sell plain and slow-release tablets. Yet, as elaborated earlier, pharmaceutical firms in India are organized under industry trade associations, which have historically played a central role in facilitating coordination among firms in responding to price controls. Therefore, despite the large number of firms selling Metformin, we expect to find evidence of price coordination.
In Figure 2 , we plot the monthly average of the normalized price per 500 mg offered by firms present in the industry. For the first 2 years, the normalized price was similar to that for formulations containing 500 and 1000 mg. However, the per-500 mg price of the 500 mg formulation began to rise in the months before September 2009, while they began to separate around the period when the consultation process to revise the NLEM in India began in September 2009. We suspect that the rise reflects prior knowledge of the timing of the workshop organized by the CDSCO.
As noted earlier, we believe that the more accurate date when the consultation for the NLEM 2011 began is earlier than September 2009 but we have been unsuccessful in identifying that date. It is therefore our understanding that the separation between 500 mg and 1000 mg lines in the months before September 2009 reflects this discrepancy. The question remains whether this measurement error in defining Period 1 biases the results in our favour or not. We believe that defining Period 1 more accurately would improve our results as the average difference in normalized prices between 500 mg and 1000 mg would be closer to zero in Period 1 as opposed to 0.027, as shown in Table 2 . Indeed for the first 14 months in Period 1, the average difference between 500 and 1000 mg prices is <0.01, or one Indian Rupee Paisa, indicating that the pre-trend becomes prominent closer to the end of Period 1. The normalized price for the 500 mg formulation increased more rapidly than the 1000 mg formulation until June 2013, when the ceiling price of Metformin is determined to have been Rs. 1.56. Subsequently, both lines began to converge and closely overlap for the last few months in our dataset. The periods of overlap separated by the period of divergence in price per 500 mg for formulations containing 500 and 1000 mg suggest selective coordination to increase prices in the 500 mg market alone.
One may argue that pharmaceutical firms sell 1000 mg tablets at a discount relative to the 500 mg tablets because they contain double the amount of the drug. However, the normalized price in the 850 mg formulation is significantly below the other two lines, precluding such an explanation. It may also be argued that the group of firms that produce the 850 mg medicine are substantially better at producing at a lower cost relative to firms producing the other two dosage strengths. Such heterogeneity in firms can bias our interpretation. However, excluding the observations for firms that produce only one of the three dosage strengths makes the results even stronger.
Next, we examine the distribution of prices across formulations from the beginning of our data in March 2007 until the ceiling price determination in June 2013. Figure 3 shows that the log normal price distribution for the regulated formulation containing 500 mg is significantly to the right of the distribution for unregulated formulations. These patterns reveal that firms coordinated on prices to selectively increase the price of the 500 mg formulation before regulation.
Next, we estimate equation (1) and show the results in column 1 of Table 3 . The coefficient estimate of Regulated is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the price of the regulated medicine was higher relative to the unregulated formulations in the initial period. The interaction terms of 'Regulated' with Periods 2 and 3 are statistically significant and positive, indicating that the price of regulated formulations increased relative to the unregulated formulations in the periods before regulation, compared with the reference period (Period 1 is from March 2007 to September 2009). The coefficient estimate of the interaction term with Period 4 is negative and significant, indicating that the price of the regulated formulation declined during period 4 relative to period 1. These patterns are consistent with our proposition that firms coordinated selectively in the 500 mg market to raise the ceiling price. Our results are robust to the exclusion of the observations for 850 mg formulations.
Next, we estimate equation (2) and present the results in column 2. The coefficient estimate of Regulated Â Period3 is positive and significant, indicating that firms, both small and large, selectively increased prices of the 500 mg formulation 'only' in the period before regulation. The dummy for large brand is perfectly collinear with firm fixed effects and is dropped, as is LargeBrand x Period4. The coefficient estimate of LargeBrand x Period3 is also positive and significant, which is congruent with a model of price coordination in which large brands with >1% market share are price leaders and small firms are price followers. The triple-interactions with Regulation and Period dummies are positive, indicating an additional increase in their prices leading up to the regulation. But surprisingly our result show that the 'Regulated Â Period 4 Â Large Brand' is more than two times larger, positive and significant compared with 'Regulated Â Period 3 Â Large Brand', likely reflecting brand loyalty and poor compliance among some large brands due to the lack of penalty for violators. 4 In column 3, we examine the role of time-release formulations. Controlling for other factors, the coefficient estimates of the triple-interaction terms for Period 2 and Period 3, are positive and statistically significant, but not for Period 4, indicating that firms in the regulated market selectively increased the prices of time-release formulations only in the period leading up to regulation. We report the full model, including the variables from columns 2 and 3 in column 4, and the results remain broadly similar and consistent with our propositions. Finally, we examine the extent of price coordination within the regulated market at various percentiles of the price distribution. We plot, in Figure 4 , the monthly price of the 500 mg Metformin at various percentiles over time. 5 The patterns indicate that the 75th-percentile price of the 500 mg Metformin rose sharply, by 40%, relative to a 3.9% increase in the 5th-percentile price during March 2007 and June 2013, indicating that the price coordination occurred among firms that charged a relatively higher price in the market. In addition, the figure shows that, while prices at the top end of the price distribution fell in Period 4, after regulation, low-end prices only increased, indicating the potential negative effects of the pricecap regulation on affordability of Metformin at the low end.
Limitations
Our study is not without limitations-a key one being that it is based on a single medicine. We examine price coordination in Metformin because the incentive for firms to manipulate the ceiling price through coordination is higher in rapidly growing markets, such as the oral anti-diabetic medicine market in India (Evans and Pollock 2015) . Our results provide evidence that such coordination 'does occur' in an important medicine market in a large developing country; however, they imply neither that such coordination is happening in other medicine markets nor that manipulating the ceiling price is the only strategy that firms use to evade price regulation. Although data limitations prevent us from expanding the scope of the study to all price-controlled medicines, some anecdotal evidence suggests that firms are employing several methods to avoid price regulation in other essential drugs, such as paracetamol (acetaminophen). To avoid the regulation imposed on the 125 mg/5 ml formulation of paracetamol suspension, GlaxoSmithKline introduced a variant of the suspension with a dosage strength of 120 mg/5 ml (PharmaBiz 2014b). Similarly, price controls on Diclofenac, a best-selling painkiller, have been ineffective. Novartis has sold 15 tablets of the 50 mg, regulated formulation under the brand name Voveran for Rs 74, whereas the ceiling price is fixed at Rs. 29.25. Although the regulator imposed a Rs. 30 million penalty on Novartis and ordered a recall, the company still sold the formulation in some Indian states. Furthermore, Novartis charged Rs. 102 for 'one' 100 mg tablet of the same medicine, as it was unregulated (PharmaBiz 2014c).
Discussion
The use of price controls to limit prices of essential medicines is an important policy choice for low-and middle-income countries such as India. Although the cost associated with expanding price controls is the delayed launch of new drugs, the purported benefit is access to more-affordable essential drugs. Yet an analysis of the impact of partial price controls on Metformin indicates that they are not effective for several reasons. First, price controls on the 500 mg formulation appear to have allowed firms to manipulate the ceiling price in the period before regulation, although the NPPA's decision in May 2013 to use prices from May 2012 to determine ceiling prices partially mitigated this effect. Second, limiting the scope of regulation to 500 mg formulations, which account for about 63% of the overall sales of Metformin, creates incentives for firms to aggressively market unregulated formulations of Metformin.
Third, the decision to leave out fixed-dose combinations further limits the effectiveness of price controls on Metformin. they have not been approved in the USA and UK, thus raising many questions about the conduct of the Indian regulatory authority that approved them (Evans and Pollock 2015, Roderick et al. 2014) .
The loopholes in the policy design are compounded by the weaknesses in implementation. Among the 652 formulations, the ceiling price has not been fixed for 102 drugs due to non-availability of price information (NPPA 2015) . Punishments of firms that violate price-cap regulation have also been ineffective. The NPPA does not have a local presence and depends on others, such as the Department of Pharmaceuticals, to monitor prices at the state level, limiting its ability to monitor and enforce the regulation.
Policy implications
India's pharmaceuticals policy is often perceived as favouring affordable access to drugs over innovation and intellectual property rights (for a discussion, see Angeli 2014 ). Yet India's drug price controls apply overwhelmingly to essential drugs whose patents have long since expired. Despite dozens of firms manufacturing these drugs, there is evidence of high inter-brand price variation within a narrowly defined drug market, reflecting profits much higher than marginal costs (Injeti 2014) . There are several ways to make essential drugs more affordable. One obvious method is to move away from partial price controls and to regulate the prices of all formulations containing an essential drug, such as Metformin and its fixeddose combinations. A less obvious method is to refine aspects of the mechanism for determining price controls to make it more effective. First, one could expand the set of firms whose prices determine the ceiling price. In theory, such a move would make it more difficult for firms to coordinate. The current mechanism-based on the data collected by IMS Health-makes it easier for large firms to coordinate on prices and evade regulation. Recent efforts by the Indian government to collect its own data directly from the manufacturers will allow for timely and comprehensive data on prices of drugs regulated under DPCO 2013 (Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers 2015) . Second, the mechanism could be designed and implemented with greater speed. Since the policy process leading up to DPCO 2013 took more than three years-from September 2009 to June 2013-firms had ample time to formulate coordinated strategies for evasion. Third, following WHO's model list, India could update its list of essential medicines more regularly and bring new drugs under comprehensive price controls.
One policy alternative is to promote generic medicines. In India, generic medicines are often marketed under brand names and receive substantial premium prices. Regulators, including the previous Chairman of NPPA, have suggested that de-branding of generic drugs is likely to be more effective than price controls in curbing prices of essential drugs (Injeti 2014) . Along these lines, India has introduced legislative measures mandating physicians to prescribe generic medicines rather than brand names (for example, Metformin as opposed to Glucophage) and has encouraged the establishment of generic drug stores that sell only de-branded generic medicines (Jan Aushadi 2008; The Hindu 2015) .
Another policy alternative is to reform the drug distribution system in India. Although considerable competition exists in upstream drug manufacturing, there is little competition in the retail drug trade in India. The retail trade association, composed of nearly 750 000 small drug stores, charges 24-30% margins, limits entry by retail chains, and prohibits discounts on medicines and the direct sale of medicines. The association's ability to punish drug manufacturers by organizing targeted boycott of sales-despite the imposition of fines from the Competition Commission of India-has only contributed to higher prices (CCI 2011; Bhaskarabhatla et al. 2015) . Promoting competition in the retail trade, which has been largely ignored in the debate on access to essential drugs, can bring about a substantial decline in prices.
Conclusion
Our results provide evidence that firms engage in price coordination to evade price-cap regulation by increasing the average price of the regulated formulation of Metformin in the period prior to regulation. Due to the open sharing of information by the regulator while formulating the mechanism for price control, and due to the lead Firm-Region clustered standard errors in parentheses;. ***P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1. Source: Authors' calculations based on the AIOCD data time in designing and implementing the price-control policy, firms appear to have preempted the likely negative impact of price regulation and adjusted their response. Even if the latest price controls were to be implemented effectively, the exclusion of fixed-dose combinations and other design flaws substantially limit the effectiveness of the current regime. Until 2002, several effective but expensive drugs were excluded from the WHO model list of essential medicines (Hogerzeil 2004 ). Subsequently, affordability became a consequence and not a precondition for a drug's inclusion on the list of essential medicines. Yet India has seen a 14-year delay in the adoption of Metformin as a price-controlled drug. Moreover, per capita use of cardiovascular and antidiabetic medicines in India is far lower compared with that in high-income countries, highlighting the need for affordable drugs in these categories (Choudhry et al. 2014) . Despite the theoretical advantages of price-cap regulation over cost-based measures, our study shows the inherent implementation challenges associated with it, particularly in the pharmaceutical industry of developing economies.
Notes
1. The AIOCD, unlike IMS Health-an alternative sourceprovides data disaggregated across 23 regions. The data are expected to be more accurate, as the retailers comply better with AIOCD-their own union that protects their trade margins on medicines-and firms are increasingly adopting the AIOCD data for their own industry analysis. 2. We ignore 0.44% observations with a pack size of more than 20, as they are likely to be spurious entries. We also exclude from the analysis dosage strengths of 250 and 750 mg, as they represent a relatively small fraction of the observations-3.7 and 1.26%, respectively. Their inclusion does not change our conclusions substantively. 3. The top 16 brands that have more than 1% market share among the 112 brands in the 500mg market. The brands (firm) are: Glycomet (USV), Glyciphage (Franco-Indian), Gluformin (Abbott Healthcare), Cetapin (Sanofi-Aventis), Gluconorm (Lupin), Obimet (Abbott), Melmet (Micro Labs), X-met (Glenmark), Riomet (Ranbaxy), Exermet (Cipla), Bigomet (Aristo), Carbophage (Merck), Metlong (Panacea), Walaphage (Wallace), Metaday (Wockhardt) and Dibeta (Torrent). Customers in India are loyal to the brand recommended by their doctor, particularly for the top brands. To the extent that their demand is inelastic, it only strengthens the ability of these firms to coordinate on prices without the fear that unilateral prices increases lead to lower market shares. 4. We find that three of the 16 large brands continued to charge above the ceiling price after August 2013. Glenmark, Sanofi-Aventis, and Abbott charged 8, 21 and 26% higher prices compared to the ceiling price. 5. We exclude from the analysis a small number of observations for firms that did not lower their prices below the ceiling price even after regulation.
